Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1973

Digest of Important Canadian Cases Reported in 1972 in the
Fields of Public International Law and Conflict of Laws
Jean-Gabriel Castel
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, castel@fake.osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
Canadian Yearbook of International Law. Volume 11 (1973), p. 347-381.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, International Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal
Theory Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Castel, Jean-Gabriel. "Digest of Important Canadian Cases Reported in 1972 in the Fields of Public
International Law and Conflict of Laws." Canadian Yearbook of International Law 11 (1973): 347-381.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of
Osgoode Digital Commons.

Digest of Important Canadian Cases
Reported in 1972 in the Fields of Public
International Law and Conflict of Laws
Compiled by

J.-G. CASTEL

I

Public InternationalLaw

Confiscation de biens situgs au Cuba par le Gouvernement Cubain
- Revendication - Quebec, Cour d'Appel
Trudeau et Bernard v. Juelle et Juelle, [1972] C.A. 870.
La confiscation est valable selon la lex situs car en l'absence de
preuve contraire, le gouvernement cubain a rempli les formalit&s
ncessaires A 1'exercice du pouvoire de confiscation selon les dispositions de l'article 24 de la Constitution de ce pays. En consequence,
le gouvernement cubain a acquis la propri6t6 des chevaux et partant,
des chevaux revendiqu&s issus des chevaux confisqus.
Extradition- Procedure- Political Crimes dence - Ontario County Court

Commission Evi-

Re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong, [1972] 3 O.R. 461, 28
D.L.R. ( 3 d) 513, 8 C.C.C. (2d) 444.
In extradition proceedings, the respondent, who was charged by
the State of Wisconsin with arson and murder in the bombing and
resultant death of a person on a university campus was denied the
sanctuary afforded by s. 21 of the Extradition Act, R.S.C., 1970, c.
E-2 1, which provides that no fugitive is liable to surrender if it appears that the offence in respect of which proceedings are taken is
one of a political character. The onus is on the requesting state to
show that the offence is not of a political character.
As to the meaning of "offence of a political nature," the Court
applied Viscount Radcliffe's formula as articulated in Schtraks v.
Gov't. of Israel, [19641 A.C. 556, at 591-92:
347
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"In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase 'offence of a
political character' is that the fugitive is at odds with the state that
applies for his extradition on some issue connected with the political
control or government of the country. The analogy of 'political' in
this context is with 'political' in such phrases as 'political refugee'
'political asylum' or 'political prisoner'. It does indicate, I think,
that the requesting State is after him for reasons other than the enforcement of the criminal law in its ordinary, what I may call its
common or international, aspect. It is this idea that the judges were
seeking to express in the two early cases of In re Castioni and In re
Meunier when they connected the political offence with an uprising,
a disturbance, an insurrection, a civil war or struggle for power:
and in my opinion it is still necessary to maintain the idea of that
connection. It is not departed from by taking a liberal view as to
what is meant by disturbance or these other words, provided that
the idea of political opposition as between fugitive and requesting
State is not lost sight of: but it would be lost sight of, I think, if one
were to say that all offences were political offences, so long as they
could be shown to have been committed for a political object or
with a political motive or for the furtherance of some political cause
or campaign. There may, for instance, be all sorts of contending
political organisations or forces in a country and members of them
may commit all sorts of infractions of the criminal law in the belief
that by so doing they will further their political ends: but if the
central government stands apart and is concerned only to enforce
the criminal law that has been violated by these contestants, I see
no reason why fugitives should be protected by this country from its
jurisdiction on the ground that they are political offenders."
In coming to the decision that the offence was not of a political
character regard was had to the fact that the university whose building was bombed had a policy which forbade classified research on
campus, and did no specific work for the army. Regard also was
had to the fact that most of the accused's witnesses who fully admitted political activity of the kind they suggested was associated
with the bombings required political asylum.
In procedural matters, depositions under oath were permitted to
prove the prima facie case as required by s. 13 of the Extradition
Act without the necessity of having viva voce evidence called. However, the extradition court had no power to order a commission to
take the evidence of witnesses out of Canada with a view of examining the deponents whose depositions were filed in support of the
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application since the Criminal Code ss. 63 7 (b), 640() (a) limits
the application for a commission to a judge of the court before
which the accused is to be tried.
Extradition- Procedure - Review Appeal

New Brunswick Court of

Re Milbury and R. (1972), 25 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 499Section 18(a) of the Federal Court Act, S.C., 1970-7 1, c. I excludes the jurisdiction of provincial courts by granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the Trial Division of the Federal Court to review by
way of prerogative writ or to grant relief from a decision of a federal board, commission, or tribunal. The applicant was committed
for surrender to a foreign state for an extraditable offence by a
County Court Judge sitting as persona designata under the Extradition Act, R.S.C., 1970, c.E-2I. It was held that for the purposes of
that hearing the Judge, as persona designata, was a federal tribunal
as defined by s.2 (g) of the Federal Court Act and accordingly the
provincial court of appeal had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari.
Extradition-

Procedure-

British Columbia Supreme Court

Re Whipple, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 613.
In extradition proceedings, production of a copy of the record of
sentence of the court before which the conviction took place is not
a condition precedent to the making of the extradition order. The
respondent in this case was convicted by a jury in the United States
of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics but absented himself before sentence was pronounced. He could not avail himself of the provision
in Article VII of the Imperial Order in Council of 189o (the extradition arrangement with the U.S.A.) requiring production before
the extraditing Court of a copy of the record of conviction and sentence, since such provision must be read with reference to the provision in the same article exempting from extradition a person who
had already served his sentence and to the principle that such Conventions are to be given a fair interpretation according to the intention of the contracting parties.
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Extradition-

Procedure-

Ontario High Court

Re Armstrong and State (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 331.
An application for an order prohibiting the county court judge
who had heard a request for a remand of an extradition proceeding
and who had, prior to entering the courtroom on that occasion,
ordered the court cleared of the public with the exception of the
press and the accused's father, from taking any further action in the
applicant's extradition proceedings was dismissed as premature since
what took place on the relevant date was an appearance before an
extradition judge for the purpose of remand and the county court
judge was not yet seised of the extradition proceeding. However,
guidelines were discussed concerning the exclusion of the public in
extradition proceedings. The right to exclude the public found in
sections 442 and 465 of the Criminal Code was incorporated into
the Extradition Act by virtue of sections 9 and 13 of that act which
prescribe that the procedure before a judge sitting on an extradition
matter is the same as that before a justice of the peace on a preliminary hearing of an indictable offence. The general rule is the
open court; with the closed court as the exception provided the
judge indicates on the record why he is excluding the public from a
judicial proceeding. Furthermore, the judge should, if possible, conduct a hearing in the presence of all counsel, the accused, and the
official court reporter on the question of exclusion.
International Criminal Law - Commission Evidence - Witnesses
out of Canada- Jurisdiction- Procedure- Ontario Court of
Appeal
Re Regina and Lester, [I1972] 2 O.R. 330.
Where new and important evidence comes to light which could
not possibly have been known at the time of the trial and which
if available at trial could not have been denied to the applicant on
a central issue in the determination of his guilt or innocence, the
evidence should be available to the Court of Appeal in the event
that it permits the applicant to refer to it. While the relief sought
cannot be granted under s. 61 o of the Criminal Code since the witnesses are residents of a foreign jurisdiction, an appeal is a "proceeding" within the meaning of ss. 637 and 64o and the order
sought may be made thereunder.
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Citizenship - Applications by Husband and Wife quirements - Citizenship Appeal Court

Residence Re-

Re Sook Ying Lum, [1972] F.C. 3.
An application for citizenship was rejected on the ground that
when she made her application she was not the wife of a Canadian
citizen and did not meet the residence requirements of s. i o( i)
(c) (i) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-I 9 .
Applicant appealed on the ground that as her husband who had
applied for citizenship at the same time, had been granted citizenship, she was relieved by s. io( I ) (c) (iii) of the residency requirements imposed under s. io(i) (c) (i).
Citizenship - Refusal to Grant - Judicial Review of Ministerial
Discretion- Ontario High Court
Dowhopoluk v. Martin et al. (I97I), 23 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 42.
Citizenship is a privilege and not a right. It would be injurious to
the public interest for the courts to inquire as to whether the minister of the Crown has properly exercised his discretion in a matter
which flows from royal prerogative. Subsections 2 (b) and (e) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights do not apply since rights in existence are
not at issue.
Citizenship -

"Resided in Canada" -

Federal Court

Blaha v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1971] F.C. 521.
The words "resided in Canada" in s. io(i) (b) of the Canadian
Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-i9, mean actual physical residence in Canada. This case was followed in Re Goldston, [1972]
F.C. 559 (Citiz. App. Ct.).
Immigration Appeal

False Statement by Applicant -

Ontario Court of

R. v. Gloede (i971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 545, [1972] I O.R. 868.
Section 50(e) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 325, now
R.S.C., 1970, c. 1-2, which makes it an offence for an applicant for
immigration not to answer truthfully all questions put to him at an
examination under the Act, applies regardless of whether the ap-
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plicant when making the statements is sworn, or affirming, or declaring.
Immigration- Application for Permanent Residence by Non-immigrant - Requirement of Medical Certificate- Supreme Court
of Canada.
Podlaszecka v. Minister of Manpower & Immigration (1972), 23
D.L.R. ( 3 d) 331.
(b) of the Immigration Regulations, Part i, SOR/
Section 29(i)
62-36, provides that "no immigrant shall be granted landing in
Canada if he is not in possession of a medical certificate, in the form
prescribed by the Minister." This section does not, however, apply
to a person who enters Canada on a visitor's visa and subsequently
applies for permanent admission. While such a person comes within
section 7(3) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 325 and
therefore "ceases to be a non-immigrant" and is "deemed to be a
person seeking admission to Canada," he is not specifically designated as an "immigrant," which word is defined by section 2 (i) as
meaning "a person who seeks admission to Canada for permanent
residence."
Immigration- Dismissal of Application for Permanent Admission
to Canada- Effect of Breach of Statute on further Application
for PermanentAdmission - Supreme Court of Canada
Leiba v. Minister of Manpower & Immigration (972), 23 D.L.R.
( 3 d) 476.
The appellant first entered Canada under a non-immigrant visa
as a visitor for a period ending January 2, 1968. On October 4,
1967, within a week after his arrival, he applied for permanent residence. He was assessed by an immigration officer according to the
prescribed norms of assessment, but his rating was below the required standard. He was not then represented by counsel, nor was
he fluent in English or French. By letter of January i9, 1968, the
appellant was advised that his application was refused for failure to
meet the required level of assessment, and he was requested to leave
Canada by February 2, 1968, on pain of the initiation of an inquiry
which might lead to deportation. This so-called "check-out" letter
was an administrative practice, nowhere expressly authorized by the
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Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1952, C. 325, S. 23 or the Immigration
Regulations, SOR/62- 3 6, s. 34(3) (d). Section 23 of the Act in fact
provided that where an immigration officer was of opinion after
examining an applicant for admission for permanent residence, that
it would be contrary to the Act or Regulations to admit him, "he
may cause such person to be detained and shall report him to a
Special Inquiry Officer." The appellant left Canada but was re-admitted on February 2, 1968, for a temporary period ending March
2, 1968. An application for permanent residence was lodged on
September 25, 1968. No fresh assessment was made and the application was refused under section 34 (3) (d) of the Regulations
on the ground that it had not been made before the expiry of the
period ending March 2, 1968. This was reported to a Special Inquiry Officer in accordance with section 23, and an inquiry was
directed. The result of the inquiry was an order of deportation on
the ground of non-compliance with section 34(3) (d) of the Regulations. An appeal was taken on the ground that the appellant had
been under-assessed on October 4, 1967 because of a failure to provide him with an interpreter. The appeal was dismissed, the Appeal
Board holding that the order was valid in that the appellant sought
to apply for permanent residence long after the expiry of his nonimmigrant status on March 2, 1968. Appellant's motion to reopen
the case was dismissed, but on appeal it was allowed. The Appeal
Board should have set aside the deportation order and the proceedings which led to it so as to leave appellant free to have the proceedings on his first application properly concluded, or it should
have directed the Special Inquiry Officer who made the deportation
order to reopen the hearing and treat it as flowing from the first
application or should have itself acted on that view, with the result
that the appellant could properly claim to be re-assessed for permanent admission. This was not a case where the appellant had not
pursued his rights of appeal against a deportation order and had
instead made a fresh application for permanent residence which
was out of time under section 34(3) (d) of the Regulations. The
appellant could not appeal in respect of his first application because
the examining officer did not carry out his statutory duty under section 23 of the Act to report the appellant to a Special Inquiry
Officer. Although the appellant did not take steps to compel an inquiry under section 23 in respect of his application of October 4,
1967, the breach of statutory duty by the examining officer could
not be as lightly set aside as was done in relation to the application
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of September 25, 1968, by reliance on his failure to observe the time
limit specified in section 34(3) (d) of the Regulations. The requirement of this provision was met by him in his original application
and were it not for what was in effect a deportation order, made
without authority under the "check-out" letter, his application
would have proceeded in regular course.
Immigration- Offences under Immigration Act British Columbia Supreme Court

Limitations

R. v. Gill, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 722, 22 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 724.
Section 52 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2, provides
a limitation period of 3 years for the institution of proceedings for
an offence under the Act. Although the offence may be triable by
summary conviction procedure, the 3-year limitation period applies
rather than the 6 months' period provided in section 721 of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-34. The Act, itself a complete
code, is embraced by the words "Except where otherwise provided
by law" contained in section 721 of the Criminal Code.
Immigration - Deportation- Special Inquiry Officer and Immigration Appeal Board not Making Proper Inquiry - Quebec
Court of Appeal
Re Horowitz and Minister of Manpower & Immigration (1972),
24 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 370.
H., a landed immigrant, was subsequently arrested on the ground
that he had given false information in his application for admission
to Canada contrary to section 19(i) (e) (viii) of the Immigration
Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 325, and that he had been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude. H. had been found guilty of negligent driving and assault while living in the U.S.A. He had appealed
and entered a plea of nolo contendere which had been accepted by
the court and had been ordered to pay fines. The special inquiry
officer, who admitted that he was not familiar with a plea of nolo
contendere, which, H. contended, was not the same as a guilty plea,
ordered H. to be deported. An appeal was dismissed by the Immigration Appeal Board. On an application for certiorari,the court
granted the application. Section 31(3) gave the Appeal Board "full
power to consider all matters" and section i1 (3) (e) empowered a
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special inquiry officer to "do all... things necessary to provide a
full and proper inquiry." In fact, neither the special inquiry officer
nor the Appeal Board had inquired into H.'s contention that the
nolo contendere plea was not a guilty plea and that therefore he had
not been convicted. Thus, the officer and the Board had omitted to
do something essential to the exercise of their jurisdiction.
Immigration- Deportation- Evidence Supreme Court of Canada

Error in Law -

Woolaston et al. v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1972),
28 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 489.
An appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of
the Immigration Appeal Board affirming an order of deportation
was dismissed upon the ground that the alleged error of law relied
upon by the appellant was actually a matter of fact upon which no
appeal to this court lies.
The appellant had been in Canada on a non-immigrant student
visa which expired on December 5, 1968. On November 2, 1968
she married another non-immigrant visitor. She did not formally
apply for permanent admission until April 3, 1969 at which time
the immigration authorities refused to process the application and
initiated deportation proceedings. The deportation order made
against her was on the ground that she was not a qualified applicant
for permanent admission under the Regulations to the Immigration
Act, not being lawfully in Canada at the time of her formal application for admission by reason of the expiry of her visa. The appellant
gave evidence before a Special Inquiry Officer to the effect that
prior to the expiry date, she had gone to the Immigration Office to
advise an officer of her intention to make application for permanent
admission but was prevented from making a formal application by
being informed that she could not apply on account of her marriage
and would be included in her husband's application; he was subsequently refused admission. The Immigration Appeal Board
affirmed the deportation order without mentioning the above evidence in its reasons. The question before the Supreme Court of
Canada was whether the Board had erred in law in failing to take
into consideration the uncontradicted evidence. The court was unable to conclude that the Board had ignored the evidence and had
thereby committed an error of law. The evidence was clearly part
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of the record before the Board and was thus to be weighed as to its
reliability and cogency along with other evidence in the case and it
was open to the Board to discount it or to disbelieve it. The fact
that it was not mentioned in the Board's reasons is not fatal to its
decision.
of Courts to Grant CertiorariDeportation Order-Jurisdiction
Immigration Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 90- Supreme
Court of Canada
Pringle v. Fraser (972), d ) 26 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 28, reversing [1971] 2
O.R. 749, I9 D.L.R. (3
129.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the original judgment and
denied jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Ontario to entertain
certiorariproceedings to quash a deportation order made under the
Immigration Act. The combination of the new scheme of review
and appeal from initial deportation orders provided for by the
establishment of the Immigration Appeal Board under the Immigration Appeal Board Act and the privative clause in section 22
of the Act giving "sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear all questions of law and fact" arising in relation to the making of deportation orders to the Board is sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
Deportation order -Inquiry -Immigration
Inquiry Reg. SOR #
67-62 1, s. i z- Federal Court of Appeal
Re Rodney and Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1972),
27 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 756.
A wife, called as a witness at an inquiry, was informed that she
and the child could be included in a deportation order made against
her husband and s. i i of the Regulations was read to her. She was
then asked to establish why she should not be included in an order
and subsequently, an order including her and the child was made.
On appeal from the Immigration Appeal Board, dismissing an appeal relating to the wife and child, the Federal Court of Appeal
held that the appeal should be allowed. Not only had the wife been
given no advance notice that an order might include her, but she
was merely informed of this, while a witness in proceedings framed
exclusively against her husband. She was thus confronted with a
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situation with little or no time to appreciate what action had to be
taken to protect her interests.
Aliens - Deportation- Immigration Appeal Board - Compassionate or Humanitarian Grounds - Supreme Court of Canada
Grillas v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (972),
23
D.L.R. ( 3 d) i.
The appellant, a Greek national, entered Canada illegally and
was ordered deported by a Special Inquiry Officer. An appeal to the
Immigration Appeal Board seeking an order under s. 15 ( I) (b) of
the Immigration Appeal Board Act, 1966-67 (Can.), c. 90 (now
R.S.C., 1970, c. 1-3), directing that the execution of the deportation
order be stayed or quashed on the ground that reasonable grounds
existed for believing that if execution of the order was carried out
the appellant would be punished for activities of a political character was dismissed by the Board. A motion was brought to have the
Board reopen the appeal on the ground that evidence respecting
certain visits by the Greek police to the home of the appellant's
mother and respecting the previous political activity of the appellant
in Greece was not available at the original hearing of the appeal,
and that the Board should reconsider its decision in the light of this
evidence. The Board, consisting of one new member who did not
sit at the original hearing, dismissed the appeal. On appeal from
that decision on the ground that the Board had improperly taken
into account as evidence statements which were made at the hearing by counsel for the respondent, it was held (Martland and Laskin JJ., dissenting) that the appeal should be dismissed. The statements made were not treated as evidence but rather as a plausible
explanation for the visits of the Greek authorities, an explanation
which did not indicate an intention to punish the appellant, if apprehended, for his political activities, but rather which suggested
that the Greek authorities were, in co-operation with Canadian immigration officials, seeking to determine the location of the appellant
in Canada in order that he might be advised to seek admission to
Canada in the proper manner. As there was no evidence before the
Board to contradict this explanation, the Board did not err in taking it into account in reaching its decision.
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Aliens - Deportation- Immigration Appeal Board - Compassionate or HumanitarianJurisdiction- Supreme Court of
Canada
Boulis v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (972), 26
D.L.R. ( 3 d) 216.
The duty imposed on the Immigration Appeal Board under s.
of the Immigration Appeal Board Act, 1966-67
i()(b)(i)
(Can.), c. 9 o , now R.S.C., 1970, c. 1-3, to deal with claims for
political asylum and to apply compassionate or humanitarian considerations to claims of lawful entry into Canada is a sensitive one
and the Parliament of Canada has made it clear that the decision
should not rest on random or arbitrary discretion but rather on the
basis of evidence the relevancy and cogency of which the Board is
to pronounce as a judicial tribunal. However, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Board, the Supreme Court
of Canada ought not to interfere with the weight assigned by the
Board to evidence before it. It is enough if the Board in its reasons
shows a grasp of the issues that are raised by s. 15 () (b) and of the
evidence addressed to them.
Income Tax - Non-resident Company - Canada-IrelandIncome
Tax Agreement - Supreme Court of Canada
Minister of National Revenue v. Tara Exploration and Development Co. Ltd. (1972), 28 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 135.
All the management and executive decisions relating to the conduct and control of the respondent company were made in Ireland.
The company, though incorporated in Ontario, had no employees
at its head office in Toronto, and no person resident in Canada had
the authority to contract or conduct business on its behalf. The company maintained a bank account in Toronto but all important decisions in respect of it were made in Ireland. The Canada-Ireland
Income Tax Agreement Act, 1955 (Can.), c. io, provided an exemption from tax for an Irish enterprise unless "engaged in trade
or business in Canada through a permanent establishment situated
therein." It was further provided that if the enterprise was so engaged tax might be imposed on profits but only on so much of them
as was "attributable to that permanent establishment." The Minister assessed for income tax the profit made by the company on the
purchase and sale of shares of another Canadian company, the de-
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cision to buy the shares having been made in Ireland. The company
appealed successfully to the Exchequer Court. On further appeal by
the Minister, The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the office in Toronto was probably not a "permanent establishment" within the meaning of the treaty, and even if
it were, the profit made on the sale of the shares was not "attributable" to such establishment.

II

Conflict of Laws

Driver's Licence Issued in Other Jurisdictionkatchewan Court of Appeal

Suspension - Sas-

R. v. Huffman, [1972] i W.W.R. 96.
A licence issued in Manitoba is liable to suspension under the
Vehicle Act of Saskatchewan as a "subsisting operator's licence."
Succession Duties - Share CertificatesCourt of Appeal

Situs -

British Columbia

First National Bank of Nevada v. Minister of Finance (1972), 5
W.W.R. 443.
The respondent bank was the personal representative of an owner
of 400 shares in a British Columbia corporation who was resident
and domiciled in the State of Nevada at the time of his death. The
share certificate was kept in Nevada. However, section 94() of the
British Columbia Companies Act required that the shares owned by
deceased members be transferred only at the principal register, i.e.
in the province of British Columbia as opposed to one of the branch
offices. Accordingly, the Minister of Finance considered that the
situs of the shares was within the province and levied succession
duty on them. The bank successfully appealed the imposition of taxation. (Sub. nom. Re Wolfenden Estate, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 168.)
The British Columbia Court of Appeal here dismissed the appeal
from that decision, holding that section 94(I) of the British Columbia Companies Act was ultra vires the provincial legislature, because it was in pith and substance an unlawful attempt under the
guise of legislation in respect of a provincially incorporated company, to alter the situs of shares of a deceased shareholder and to
subject them to provincial succession duties.
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Competence des Tribunauxde Qudbec

Possession de Biens dans la Province

Code de Procidure Civile, art. 68(i) -

Quebec, Cour Provinciale

M. Botner & Sons Inc. v. Southern Pacific Co., [1972] R.P. 7.
Les sommes dues par le Canadien National et le Pacifique Canadien t la d6fenderesse sont des biens situ&s dans la province puisqu'il
s'agit de dettes actives, attach~es comme telles A la personne du
dtbiteur oii il se trouve, soit A ces deux compagnies ayant leur siege
social k Montreal.
Compitence des Tribunaux - Demande Reconventionnelle
Code de Procidure Civile, arts. x6 3 , z68,
d'Appel

72 -

Qudbec, Cour

Yoshioka & Crea Ltd. v. Interprex Dairy Products Ltd. et al.,
[19721 C.A. 686.
Une soci~t6 6trangre domicili6e au Brsil n'ayant aucune place
d'affaires au Qu6bec et n'y transigeant aucune affaire qui poursuit
au Quebec une soci~t6 domicili6e dans cette province ne saurait se
plaindre si cette demire, en d~fense, utilise le meme tribunal pour
une demande reconventionnelle. I1 n'est d'ailleurs pas exact de prtendre que la demanderesse n'a pas de biens dans la province de
Quebec, ne serait-ce que la cr~ance qu'elle pr6tend exercer contre le
deffendeur.
Jurisdiction- Possession of Property within the Provincebec Superior Court

Que-

Ross and Pronghorn Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Tsumura and
Others, [1972] C.S. 194.
Shares in "street form" held in Quebec for the benefit of and in
trust for the defendant gives the Quebec courts jurisdiction over
him. The broker had possession of the shares for the benefit of the
defendant who was then in possession of property in the Province
according to article 68(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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Sale of Land Outside Jurisdiction- Action for Specific Performance - New Brunswick Supreme Court - Appeal Division
Ward v. Coffin (972), 27 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 58 (972), 4 N.B.R.
(2d) 481.
Since the defendant resided in New Brunswick and since a claim
for specific performance is an action in personam, the court had
jurisdiction to entertain the action even though the land was situated in the province of Quebec.
Jurisdiction- Procedure- Third Party Proceedings- Service Ex
Juris - Ontario Supreme Court Master's Chambers
Dow Chemicals of Canada Ltd. v. PritchardCanadian Ltd. et al.,
[1972] 2 O.R. 399.
Where a foreign defendant enters an appearance after unsuccessfully attacking the order permitting service ex juris and third party
proceedings are brought against the foreign defendant and a foreign
third party by a co-defendant and service is made on the foreign
defendant in the main action, the action is not "properly brought
against another person duly served within Ontario" within the
meaning of Rule 25(I) (j) so as to permit service ex juris of the
third party notice on the foreign third party.
Jurisdiction-Service
Non Conveniens-

Ex Juris-Breach of Contract -Forum
Northwest Territories TerritorialCourt

Cadillac Explorations Ltd. (N.P.L.) v. Penarroya Canada Ltee et
3 o D.L.R. ( 3 d) 326.

al. (1972),

Service of Writ Ex Juris- Tort Action
preme Court in Chambers

-

British Columbia Su-

Leigh Marine Services Ltd. v. Harburn Leasing Agency Ltd.
(972), 25 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 604.
Under Order i i, rule i (ee) of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, service of a writ or of notice of a writ may be allowed
out of the jurisdiction where the action is founded on a "tort committed within the jurisdiction." These words must be limited to a
wrongful act committed within the jurisdiction and do not extend
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to a case where the wrongful act was committed outside the jurisdiction, but the damage therefrom took place within the jurisdiction. In an action for negligence, the three elements of the tort,
namely duty of care, breach of that duty, and damage, must be
present within the jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction- Service of Statement of Claim Ex Juris - Action in
Tort Based on Riparian Rights - Wrongful Act Outside Province Causing Damage to Land Within - R. 30(a) -Alberta
Court of Appeal
Town of Peace River v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 351.
The plaintiff, a town in Alberta, sued to recover damages by reason of the decrease of its water supply resulting from the construction by the defendant, a British Columbia corporation, of a dam in
British Columbia on the Peace River which reduced the flow of
water as it passed through the town. An ex parte order for service
ex juris was made from which this appeal was taken. It was argued
that because the reduction in the flow of water downstream from
the dam occurred in British Columbia, the whole subject matter
was not land situate within the jurisdiction as required by R. 30(a).
The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the appeal must be dismissed. In the light of the nature and history of the cause of action,
which might be classified as a tort based upon the plaintiff's riparian rights, it was clear that the whole subject matter was "land
within Alberta" within R. 30(a).
JurisdictionAppeal

Tort -

Service Ex Juris - Saskatchewan Court of

Moran et al. v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1972] 5 W.W.R.
456.
Appeal was allowed from a judgment granting an application for
leave to commence a tort action against the appellant in Saskatchewan and for service ex juris, [1972] 3 W.W.R. 16I. The tort
was committed in Ontario where the defendant corporation was resident. The court found that the judge had exercised his discretion
under section 54 of the Saskatchewan Queen's Bench Act upon the
erroneous understanding that that section enlarged the rules as to
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jurisdiction of the court to allow service out of the jurisdiction. Section 54 provides that no action shall be brought in Saskatchewan
for damages in respect of a tort committed outside the province except by special leave of the court or a judge. As such, it does not
grant jurisdiction but rather allows the court to decline jurisdiction
in an area where there had previously been an unqualified right to
bring action in Saskatchewan (i.e., where the defendant could be
served within the territorial jurisdiction, no matter where the tort
was committed).
In general, in an action in personam, the rules as to the legal service of a writ define the limits of the court's jurisdiction. The Rules
of Practice and Procedure provide for allowing service out of the
jurisdiction. However, there is no jurisdiction in the courts to permit
service outside the boundaries of the province except as provided for
in the Rules. The order for service made was held to be improper
since it could not be allowed under the Rules and since it was
predicated upon the invalid premise that section 54 was an enabling
section. Furthermore the court found that the judge when exercising
his discretion to grant leave under section 54 had failed to take into
consideration that no order could be made for service ex juris.
Jurisdiction- Service Ex JurisHigh Court

Forum Conveniens -

Ontario

Bonlyn Products Ltd. v. Amer. Home Products Corpn., [1972] I
O.R. 640.
Where an American parent company of a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary is a necessary and proper party to an action brought
in Ontario, the principle of the corporate veil cannot be applied in
determining whether Ontario is the forum conveniens.
Jurisdiction- Proper Law of Contract- Application for StaySaskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench
E. K. Motors Ltd. v. Volkswagen Can. Ltd., [1972] 2 W.W.R. 700.
Plaintiff sued on a contract which contained a clause reading
"This Agreement is subject to the laws of the Province of Ontario
and to the exclusive jurisdiction of her Courts." The defendant applied for a stay on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction. In dismissing the application the court held that although
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a clause ousting jurisdiction was not, in law, considered contrary to
public policy, such a clause was not necessarily binding: where there
was no substantial difference between the law of Ontario and that
of Saskatchewan, where there was no question but that a fair trial
might be had, and that the balance of convenience and the saving
of expense clearly pointed to the desirability of trial in Saskatchewan, plaintiff should be permitted to proceed there.
Procedure- Lis Pendens Supreme Court

Stay of Actions

-

British Columbia

Hume & Rumble v. Commonwealth Construction Co. Ltd., [1972]
4 W.W.R. 546.
A motion to stay two actions in the British Columbia Supreme
Court as vexatious, oppressive, and an abuse of the process of the
court on the ground that an action between the same plaintiff and
defendant concerning the same subject matter and claiming the
same relief was pending in a Manitoba County Court was dismissed. The plaintiff, a British Columbia corporation, was the subcontractor and the defendant, also a British Columbia corporation,
was the general contractor for a building project in Manitoba. The
action pending in the Manitoba County Court was in respect of
work and materials supplied to the defendant and was commenced
under the Manitoba Mechanics Lien Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. M-8o.
The actions in the British Columbia Supreme Court sounded in
contract and in the alternative quasi-contract or quantum meruit.
The question of whether a valid subsisting contract existed with
respect to the work performed was at issue in both actions. The
judge hearing this motion accepted evidence to the effect that under
the law of Manitoba it remained an open question whether a valid
lien can be established on a claim merely in quasi-contract. Therefore the possibility existed that the plaintiff would be unable to enforce a claim under the Manitoba Mechanics Lien Act.
Applying the principles with respect to abuse of process and the
prosecution of suits in two jurisdictions, the court stressed that to
justify a stay, the burden of showing that the action was vexatious
and that the stay will not cause injustice to the plaintiff lies on the
defendant. Where there is a fair possibility, as here, that the plaintiff may have an advantage by proceeding in one jurisdiction notwithstanding that an action is pending in another, he will be
allowed to do so.
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Jurisdiction- Lis Pendens Court

Procedure - Torts -

Ontario High

Kraft et al. v. The Queen in the right of the Province of Ontario
et al., [1972] 3 O.R. 684.
An application to strike out paragraphs of a statement of claim
as an abuse of process on the ground that the action was premature
was dismissed notwithstanding the fact that the precise amount
claimed in an action for indemnity or contribution was dependent
upon the outcome of proceedings in another jurisdiction and had
not yet been finally determined.
The action arose out of an accident involving a series of collisions
on Burlington Skyway following a freezing rain. The plaintiff in this
action were the owners and the driver of a public transit bus which
had collided with a second vehicle resulting in serious injuries to
several passengers. The passengers who claimed to have suffered injuries brought their actions for damages in the State of New York
but the litigation had not yet reached judgment. Under the procedure that governs the courts of New York State, there is no provision for joinder of third parties from whom contribution or indemnity is sought. The bus company accordingly sought relief in
Ontario with respect to these New York claims alleging negligence
on the part of the second vehicle and of the Highways Department
and claiming contribution and indemnity for any liability, damage,
or expense arising out of the collisions. The court held that section
3 of the Negligence Act, R.S.O., 1970, c. 296 protects the plaintiff
insofar as the assertion of a right to contribution and indemnity is
concerned, notwithstanding that the precise amount with respect to
which relief is sought has not been finally determined.
Lis Pendens - Compitence des Tribunaux - Code de Procidure
Civile, art. 165 - Quibec, Cour Supirieure
Unger v. Rosenfeld et autres et Pronghorn Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. et Guaranty Trust of Canada, [1972] C.S. 673.
L'existence d'un recours intent6 h l'&ranger ne peut creer litispendance.
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Procedure- Compitence des tribunaux- Assignation pour interrogatoire ti Montreal - Accident en Ontario- Deux Actions
pendantes en Ontario- Si ge Social du Difendeur en Ontario.
Code de Procidure civile, art. 282 - Quebec, Cour d'Appel
Cornwall Chrysler Plymouth Ltd. v. Lapolla et Autres, [1972] C.A.
875.
Une personne residant en Ontario ne peut &re contrainte de comparaitre comme temoin au Quebec s'il y a une autre action pendante
pour la meme cause dans la Province d'Ontario.
Marine Marchande- Procedure- Validite de la clause compromissoire de la charte partie- Article 95! du Code de Procedure
Civile - Cour fedrale, Division de premiere instance
Le Syndicate de Normandin Lumber Ltd. c. Le navire Angelic
Poweret al., [197x] C.F. 263.
Par une charte-partie signe
Londres le 4 janvier 1970, la demanderesse affr6ta le navire defendeur. La chartepartie prevoyait
que tout differend entre les proprietaires et les affreteurs devait 8tre
regle par des arbitres t Londres. Le 28 janvier 1970, la demanderesse intenta une action devant cette cour pour rupture de chartepartie, le capitaine du navire ayant refuse de signer les connaissements relatifs A la cargaison chargee Quebec.
La Cour f6drale d&cida que bien que l'article 951 du Code de
procedure civile du Quebec reconnaisse la validite de la clause compromissoire, cette derniere ne peut exclure la comptence de la Cour
f
r&ale; en cons6quence, l'action ne peut etre rejetee mais seulement suspendue jusqu' 1'arbitrage.
La Cour federale s'exprima ainsi:
La premiere question que soul~ve cette affaire est celle de la
validite et de l'effet de la clause compromissoire dont se prevalent
les defendeurs.
Dans l'affaire National Gypsum Co. c. Northern Sales Ltd.,
[1964] R.C.S. 144, la Cour supreme du Canada a confirme une
decision de la Cour de l'Echiquier siegeant en amiraut6, qui avait
rejete une requ&e comme celle qui m'est sourmise pour le motif
qu'une clause compromissoire comme celle dont se prevalent les dfendeurs serait nulle et contraire
l'ordre public. Pour en venir t
cette conclusion, la majorit6 de la Cour a d'abord consider qu'une
clause compromissoire est une convention relative ' la procedure et
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que, en consequence, sa validit6 doit 8tre d&erminee par la lex fori.
Comme il ne se trouvait, dans les r~gles en vigueur, aucune disposition concernant cette matikre, il fallait, suivant la r~gle de pratique
2 ( I ) (b) des R~gles de la Cour de l'Echiquier, se r~frer au droit du
Quebec, oi la cause d'action avait pris naissance, pour appr6cier la
validit6 de la clause. Et c'est parce que le droit de la province de
Quebec condamnait les clauses compromissoires comme contraires
, l'ordre public que la Cour supreme en est venue i la conclusion
qu'il ne fallait pas, dans l'affaire qui lui &ait soumise, donner effet
t la clause compromissoire.
Comme je me considre li par cette d6cision, je devrais, si le
droit de la province de Quebec n'avait pas et6 modifii depuis qu'elle a &6 rendue, declarer que la clause compromissoire dont se
prevalent les d~fendeurs est nulle et, en consequence, rejeter la requ&e qui m'est soumise. Mais il arrive que le droit qu~bcois n'est
plus, depuis 1965, ce qu'il &ait auparavant. Cette anne-la', en effet,
la l6gislature a dict: un nouveau Code de procddure civile qui, 'a
l'Article 951 r~glemente expresshment la clause compromissoire:
951. La clause compromissoire doit 6tre constat~e par 6crit.
Lorsque le diff&rend pr~vu est n6, les parties doivent passer compromis. Si l'une d'elles s'y refuse, et ne nomme pas d'arbitre, il est proc~d6
Lcette nomination et la d~signation des objets en litige par un juge
du tribunal comptent, A moins que la convention elle-m~me n'en ait
d6cid6 autrement.
Malgr6 l'adoption du texte nouveau, certaines d6cisions de la
Cour suptrieure du Quebec continuent consid&er qu'une clause
compromissoire comme celle qui nous intresse est contraire h l'ordre
public (Borenstein c. Trans American Investment and Development
Co., [19701 Qu& C.S. 192; Sun and Sea Estates Ltd. c. Aero-hydraulics Corp., [1968] QuL R. P. 210), mais ces d~cisions m'apparaissent mal fondtes, car je ne vois pas comment le lgislateur
qu&bcois aurait pu r~glementer la forme et l'effet d'une convention dont il n'admettrait pas la validitY. D'ailleurs, l'opinion qu'
expriment ces quelques decisions n'est pas partag~e par tous les magistrats qu~b~cois (Singer Plumbing and Heating Co. c. Richard,
[19681 Qu& B.R. 547; Mobilcolor Productions c. Gula, [1968]
Que. R.P. 22; Morin c. Travelers Indemnity Co., [1970] Qu6. C.S.
84). Elle ne l'est pas davantage par les auteurs qui ont tudi6 ce
problkme: John E. C. Brierley, Aspects of the Promise to Arbitrate
in the Law of Quebec, 197o Revue du Barreau, p. 473; Emile
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Colas, Clause compromissoire, un compromis et arbitrage en droit
nouveau, 1968 Revue du Barreau, p. 129.
Je crois donc qu'une clause compromissoire comme celle qui
m'est soumise est aujourd'hui valide en droit qu~bcois et que, en
consequence, je ne saurais en prononcer la nullit6.
Mais, ici, un autre probl~me se soulve. Si, comme 'a dcid la
Cour supreme dans l'affaire National Gypsum, il faut, dans un proc~s ohi la cause d'action a pris naissance au Quebec, s'en remettre
la loi qucb&oise pour appr&ier la validit6 de la clause compromissoire, il semblerait logique qu'il faille 6galement s'en remettre au
droit de cette province pour en appr&ier l'effet. Or, suivant le droit
qu6b&ois, lorsque des parties un contrat ont convenu de soumettre
a l'arbitrage des diff&ends qui pourront les opposer, les tribunaux
sont incomptents t connaltre de pareils litiges. En droit qu~b~cois
comme en droit fran~ais (Dalloz: Ripertoire de droit civil, v bo compromis, no i26 et suivants), la clause compromissoire a pour effet
de limiter la juridiction du tribunal. C'est pourquoi, dans le cas ot
une partie intente des procedures judiciaires pour faire trancher un
diff&end qu'elle a convenu de soumettre l'arbitrage, les tribunaux,
A moins que l'autre partie n'accepte de r6voquer la clause compromissoire, se d&larent incomp6tents et rejettent purement et
simplement l'action. Auto FabricProducts Co. c. Kaplan Construction Co., [1949] Qu . B.R. 241, Mobilcolor Productions Inc. c.
Gula, [1968] Qua. R.P. 22; Morin c. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
[1970] QuL C.S. 84. Donc, si, dans une affaire comme celle-ci, il
fallait se reffrer au droit qub&ois pour d~terminer l'effet de la
clause compromissoire, il faudrait dire qu'une pareille convention a
pour effet de soustraire h la juridiction de la Cour des litiges qui,
suivant la loi, sont de sa competence. Or, une pareille conclusion
m'apparalt inacceptable. Les lois qui d~finessent la competence de
cette Cour et de celle qu'elle a remplac~e sont des lois d'ordre public
auxquelles les citoyens ne peuvent se soustraire. Et si, en common
law, la clause compromissoire est depuis longtemps tenue pour
valide, c'est parce que l'on considre 'que cette convention n'a pas
pour effet d'exclure la competence des tribunaux. Ainsi, dans
l'affaire Atlantic Shipping & Trading Co. c. Louis Dreyfus and Co.,
[1922] 2 A.C. 25 o , Lord Dunedin disait la page 255:
[Traduction] Vos Seigneuries, sous l'empire de l'ancien droit on a
souvent soutenu que la clause compromissoire 6tait nulle parce qu'elle
excluait la comp6tence des tribunaux, mais cette th6se fut finalement
abandonn6e dans l'arr6t Scott c. Avery 5 H.L.C. 8i i. Selon mon inter-
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pr~tation de cet arr&t, on ne peut plus dire qu'une telle clause exclue
la comp&ence du tribunal; au contraire, on invoque cette competence
pour la faire observer et il n'y a rien de mal A ce que des personnes
conviennent que des diffrends qui pourraient survenir entre eux soient
r6gl6s par arbitrage. Il s'ensuit que la disposition en question est acceptable dans la mesure oii elle pr6voit l'arbitrage.
La lkgislature d'une province peut bien, si elle le desire, reconnaitre aux citoyens le droit de se soustraire la jurisdiction des tribunaux qui rel~vent de sa propre competence lkgislative. Cependant,
le l~gislateur provincial n'a pas le pouvoir de permettre que l'on se
soustraie h la juridiction des tribunaux dont la competence est
ddfinie par le parlement f~dral. I est donc impossible qu'une clause
compromissoire dont le droit du Quebec reconnalt la validit ait
pour effet de soustraire un litige h la comptence de cette Cour ou
de celle qui l'a pr~c~d~e. On ne peut donner effet A des clauses compromissoires que dans la mesure oii elles ne portent pas atteinte h la
juridiction de cette Cour. De cela il r~sulte qu'une clause compromissoire comme celle dont il s'agit ici ne peut pas avoir pour
effet de modifier la competence de la Cour et que, pour ce motif, la
Cour, lorsqu'elle est saisie d'une requite comme celle-ci, ne doit pas
rejeter l'action pour cause d'absence de juridiction, mais peut seulement ordonner la suspension des procedures.
Pour un commentaire voir Etienne Croteau (1972), 32 R du B.
298. Aussi J.-G. Castel, Quelques questions de procedure en droit
international priv6 qutb6cois (i97i), 31 R. du B. 134, aux pp.
139-45.
Procedure- Foreign Joint Venture County Court

Registration-

Nova Scotia

Fischbach & Moore of Canada Ltd. et al. v. Gulf Oil CanadaLtd.
et al. ( 9 72), 2 3 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 6o6.
A joint venture of federal and foreign corporations cannot bring
an action in Nova Scotia to enforce a lien for materials and labour
supplied in performance of a contract made in part in that province
unless it is registered under the Partnerships and Business Names
Registration Act (N.S.).
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Caution Judicatur Solvi - Code de ProcidureCivile, arts. 65, 67,
152. Quibec, Cour Supgrieure
Schock v. St. Pierre, [1972] R.P. I55.
La presence d'un codemandeur ridant au Quebec ne fait pas
perdre au dffendeur le droit d'exiger du demandeur 6tranger le
cautionnement pour les frais.
Divorce Action - Security for Costs - Cross Demand Code of
Civil Procedure, art. 65 - Quebec Superior Court
Dame Bedel v. Bedel, [1972] C.S. 71x.
Since the entry into force of the new Code of Civil Procedure, the
question whether a non-resident defendant who includes a cross demand with his defence should be obliged to put up security for
costs has been a controverted one. However the court held that the
request for security should be dismissed as a cross demand is more
an incident in a single action than a new action itself.
Seizure in Garnishment- Banking - Branches - Jurisdiction
Over Persons and Property- Quebec ProvincialCourt
Equity Accounts Buyers Ltd. v. Jacob et la Banque Royale du Canada, [1972] R.P. 326.
In this case, the plaintiff obtained judgment in the Provincial
Court in Montreal against a debtor domiciled in Ontario. The
plaintiff then made a seizure in garnishment against the bank
account of the debtor at a branch of the Royal Bank of Canada in
Ottawa and the writ was served on the aforesaid branch as well
as upon the head office of the bank in Montreal. The bank either
through its head office or its branch, did not answer the seizure by
garnishment and plaintiff obtained judgment by default against the
tierce saisie which later attacked this judgment by a requite en revocation which was granted.
The court held that a writ of garnishment does not bind and
affect the property of a bank situated at its head office when the
judgment debtor's account is located in a branch outside the province.
The service of a writ of garnishment on the branch of the bank
in Ottawa was not valid and binding.
When a seizure is issued in the hands of a bank proposing to
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attach the bank account or other assets of any defendant, it is only
the assets of the defendant that are found in that branch that can
be subject to the seizure; it does not extend to other accounts at
other branches. Thus the obligation of the bank is only to pay the
money at the branch where it has been deposited and conversely the
depositor cannot demand that the money be paid at any other
branch.
Quebec courts have no jurisdiction to order someone from another province to come to Montreal and declare what he owes the
debtor.
Conditional Sale District Court

Removal of Object Sold -

Efect -

Alberta

Gen. Motors Accept. Corpn. v. Prestie, [1972] 3 W.W.R. 534Where a contract for the conditional sale of an automobile, made
in Ontario, is registered in the Motor Vehicle Branch within 21 days
of the seller receiving notice of its permanent removal into Alberta,
the relief afforded by the Conditional Sales Act, R.S.A., 1970, c. 61,
s. 14(2) is available to him in defeasance of the rights of bona fide
purchasers for value without notice whose rights stem from the
fraudulent acts of the conditional purchaser and accrued before the
conditional vendor "received notice." There is no requirement in
law that a conditional vendor exercise any particular degree of vigilance in tracing an itinerant machine which has been removed from
the province where it was first sold, as for instance, by searching the
registries of other provinces.
Foreign Conditional Sales Contract - Repossession Ontario Legislation - Ontario High Court

Efect of

Morin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of CanadaLtd. (1972),
27 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 46.
Under the terms of a conditional sales contract entered into in
Quebec between Quebec residents, repossession of the motor vehicle
purchased was effected in Ontario by the finance company. Section
35 of the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O., I970, c. 82
provides that where 2/3 of the purchase price of the goods as fixed
by contract has been paid, any provision in a contract allowing for
repossession is not enforceable except by leave of a county court
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judge. Here since 2/3 of the purchase price (which was found to include finance charges) had not been paid, leave was not required.
However, the judge remarked in obiter that had that amount been
paid, section 35 would have applied to any repossession effected in
Ontario notwithstanding that it was under a contract entered into
in Quebec between Quebec residents. Section 36 of the Ontario
Consumer Protection Act requiring a clear statement in writing of
certain terms of the contract was held to be inapplicable to a transaction entered into in Quebec between parties resident in Quebec
when credit was granted.
Sale - Currency - Goods Sold and Delivered from Germany Payable in U.S. Funds - Judgment Obtained in U.S. FundsQuebec Court of Appeal
Carsley Silk Co. Ltd. v. Koechlin Baumgartner& Cie., [1972] C.A.
267 (1972), 23 D.L.R. (3 d) 255.
According to sections ii and 12 ( I ) of the Currency Mint & Exchange Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. 39, a person cannot be condemned to
pay a sum of money for goods sold and delivered in the currency
of a foreign country.
This rule applies to both public accounts and private agreements.
Arbitration- Contract- Law Applicable - Jurisdictionkatchewan Court of Appeal

Sas-

Re O'Brien and C.P.R. (1972), 25 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 230.
Where the intention of the parties respecting the proper law of a
contract is not expressly stated in such contract, it may be inferred
from the terms and nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances or, failing that, by referring to the system of law with
which the contract has its closest and most real connection. Although the collective agreement did not expressly state the law to
govern the arbitration procedure, it may be inferred that the parties
provided for the establishment of the Canadian Railway Office of
Arbitration in Montreal in order to overcome the problems necessarily inherent in determining the applicable law to arbitration procedure in a collective agreement connected with more than one
jurisdiction, and, in so doing, intended that the arbitrator, in arbitration thereunder, would be governed by the laws of Quebec and
the courts of that province.
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Vicarious Liability -Actionable
Act by Lex Fori and Lex Loci
Delicti- Quebec Court of Appeal
Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Dame Lagacd and Zimone,
[1972] C.A. 455.
The appeal from the award of a lower Quebec court to the
widow of the victim of a motor accident which occurred in the
province of Ontario was dismissed with the finding that there was
no real conflict between Ontario and Quebec law on the facts of
this case. The victim was a gratuitous passenger in a car owned by
the appellant and driven by a man who was not an employee of the
appellant company. The appeal court upheld the finding that there
had been gross negligence on the part of the driver and that the car
was driven with the implied consent of the company. Accordingly
the act was actionable in both Ontario (Highway Traffic Act, 196o,
c. 172, s. 105(i) and (2)) and Quebec (Highway Victims Indemnity Act, R.S.Q., 1964, c. 232, s. 3 (a), (b), and (c)).
Wills - Non-resident Executor peal

Probate-

Alberta Court of Ap-

Re Amery Estate (1972), 25 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 126.
In Alberta the power to grant probate to a non-resident executor,
even an alien non-resident, exists as a necessary inference from s.
6(2) of the Administration of Estates Act, R.S.A., 1970, c.I which
provides that a bond is not required on application for probate
where the applicant is the executor under the will and resident in
Alberta.
Form of Wills - Probate-

Movables -

Ontario Court of Appeal

Re Bishop, [1972] I O.R. 183.
A holograph will executed in Ontario by a person domiciled in
Ontario at the time of the will's execution is nevertheless valid and
admissible to probate so far as it relates to an interest in movables
within Ontario despite its failure to comply with the formalities required by s. i of the Wills Act, R.S.O. i96o, c. 433 (now R.S.O.
1970, c. 499), where it is made as permitted by s. 19 (4) (C), in
accordance with the law in force at the time of its making in the
place where the testator had his domicile of origin.
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Domicile of Choice -

Immigration Act -

Acquisition -

1973

Unlawful Residence under

Ontario High Court

Jablonowski v. Jablonowski, [1972] 3 O.R. 410.
The petitioner was held to have acquired a domicile of choice in
Canada for the purposes of the Divorce Act notwithstanding that he
could not be considered domiciled in Canada for purposes of the
Immigration Act since his entry and therefore his residence in Canada were unlawful. The court held that since the Divorce Act did
not define domicile, the common law principles with respect to the
acquisition of a domicile of choice applied. Therefore, both the animus manendi and factum being present, the petitioner had acquired
the domicile of choice in Canada at common law. The definition of
domicile in the Immigration Act merely indicates the degree of
connection with Canada which is required for immigration matters
and does not extend beyond the purposes of that Act.
Indians-Meaning of "Ordinarily resident"-IndianAct-Manitoba Queen's Bench
Canard v. Attorney Generalof Canadaand Rees, [1972] 4 W.W.R.
6x8.
The words "ordinarily reside" are not defined in the Indian Act
but have been the subject of frequent judicial interpretation. The
authorities are to the effect that a person can have more than one
"ordinary residence" according to the particular facts. The court
quoted Rand J. in Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] S.C.R. 2o9, at 224,
to the effect that:
The gradation of degrees of time, object, intention, continuity and
other relevant circumstances, shows, I think, that in common parlance
"residing" is not a term of invariable elements, all of which must be
satisfied in each instance. It is quite impossible to give it a precise and
inclusive definition. It is highly flexible, and its many shades of meaning vary not only in the contexts of different matters, but also in different aspects of the same matter. In one case it is satisfied by certain
elements, in another by others, some common, some new.
The expression "ordinarily resident" carries a restricted signification,
and although the first impression seems to be that of preponderance in
time, the decisions on the English Act [i.e., the Income Tax Act of the
United Kingdom] reject that view. It is held to mean residence in the
course of the customary mode of life of the person concerned, and it is
contrasted with special or occasional or casual residence. The general
mode of life is, therefore, relevant to a question of its application.
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For the purposes of income tax legislation, it must be assumed that
every person has at all times a residence....
And at

2 25:

But in the different situations of so-called "permanent residence",
"temporary residence", "ordinary residence", "principal residence" and
the like, the adjectives do not affect the fact that there is in all cases
residence; and that quality is chiefly a matter of the degree to which
a person in mind and fact settles into or maintains or centralizes his
ordinary mode of living with its accessories in social relations, interests
and conveniences at or in the place in question. It may be limited in
time from the outset, or it may be indefinite, or so far as it is thought
of, unlimited. On the lower level, the expressions involving residence
should be distinguished, as I think they are in ordinary speech, from
the field of "stay" or "visit".
"Ordinarily resident in the constituency" - Meaning for the Purpose of Elections - Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Re Quandt and Guy (972), 26 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 489.
Persons working temporarily in the constituency and having a
permanent residence elsewhere are not qualified to vote under the
Saskatchewan Election Act, S.S., 1971, c. IO,s.28(2).
Marriage- Validity - Foreign Divorce Ontario High Court

Expert Evidence

-

Viccari v. Viccari (1972), 7 R.F.L. 241, [19721 3 O.R. 7o6.
In a claim for moneys owing under a separation agreement, the
issue of the validity of a marriage was resolved in favour of the
plaintiff as a consequence of the finding that a previous Mexican
divorce decree would be recognized in Ontario since it would be
valid in New York state, the place of domicile of the divorced husband at the time of the decree of divorce. The trial judge rejected
the opinion of the expert on New York law that it was doubtful that
the Mexican decree would have been recognized as valid in New
York state at the time of granting of the decree and referred to a
case quoted by the expert witness to substantiate his conclusion that
such a decree would in fact have been valid.
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Jurisdiction-

Ontario High Court

Dimitrijevic v. Dimitrijevic, [1972] 3 O.R. 335, 28 D.L.R. ( 3 d)
'77.
An Ontario court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
divorce or to grant corollary relief by a wife having a domicile of
origin in Yugoslavia but residing in New York, even though her
husband is domiciled in Ontario. The domicile of the wife is to be
determined as if she were unmarried.
Divorce - Jurisdiction- Change of Domicile after Petition but
before Trial - British Columbia Supreme Court
Weston v. Weston, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 402.
Proceedings for divorce, commenced in the jurisdiction of the petitioner's then domicile, can be continued there notwithstanding a
change of domicile before trial.
Divorce - Jurisdictionpreme Court

Lis Pendens -

British Columbia Su-

Barlow v. Barlow (1972), 26 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 379.
Although s. 5(2) (a) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. D-8,
provides in part that "if petitions were presented on different days
and the petition that was presented first is not discontinued within
thirty days after the day it was presented, the court to which a petition was first presented has exclusive jurisdiction.. . ," the language
of the section should be restricted to cases where one petition is
commenced by one spouse and a second petition is commenced by
the other spouse, since the object of the section is to prevent more
than one contest between the parties. Therefore, the mere existence
of an earlier petition presented by the same petitioner is not a bar
to another court assuming jurisdiction under a later petition.
Maintenance- Recognition of ForeignDivorce pel - Ontario County Court

Status -

Estop-

Re Reid and Reid, [19721 1 O.R. 5 5 4 , 2 3 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 538.
Where an applicant brought proceedings under the Deserted
Wive's and Children's Maintenance Act of Ontario, the respondent
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was not estopped from questioning his Nevada marriage to the applicant on the ground that while domiciled in Ontario he had divorced his first wife in Michigan. The applicant was not legally
married to the respondent and therefore unable to bring such proceedings. While many cases have held that one spouse who obtains
an invalid divorce is precluded from attacking the validity of the
decree, they have dealt uniformly with matters of money or property
as between spouses or their representatives. In this case the status of
the respondent is at stake. He may be estopped under some circumstances from denying the validity of the Michigan divorce, but he
cannot be estopped from denying the validity of his subsequent
marriage.
Infants -

Jurisdiction-

Custody -

Ontario High Court

Re Vadera and Vadera, [1972] 1 O.R. 441.

The court made an order under the Infants Act, R.S.O., 1970,
c. 222, requiring the father to return the child to the custody of the
applicant wife pending trial of an issue as to custody where the
father respondent had removed the child from the province without
the consent of the mother but himself remained within Ontario.
Habeas corpus was not found to be the appropriate remedy in the
circumstances.
Custody - JurisdictionBench Division
Adams v. Adams (

9

New Brunswick Supreme Court, Queen's

72), 4 N.B.R. (2d) 275.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to make a custody award
pursuant to the corollary relief sections of the Divorce Act notwithstanding that the children in question were temporarily absent from
the jurisdiction having been surreptitiously removed to British Columbia by the respondent wife. To all intents and purposes a court
sitting in such matters acts as a Federal Court.
In addition, under its inherent provincially-derived jurisdiction, a
court has jurisdiction over the custody of a child ordinarily resident
within its territory, even though the child may be temporarily outside.
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Divorce - JurisdictionAppeal

Interim Custody -

Ontario Court of

Johnson v. Johnson et al., [19721 1 O.R. 212.
A court in divorce proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain an
interim custody application notwithstanding that immediately prior
to the application one party, sensing defeat, takes de facto custody
and leaves the jurisdiction, provided he resided within it before
such move.
Infants -

Custody -

Jurisdiction-

Ontario Court of Appeal

Re Ridderstroem and Ridderstroem, [1972] 2 O.R. 113.
The appeal from an order refusing to grant custody of a child to
the father or to direct the trial of an issue as to custody was dismissed. The parents of the child were domiciled in Denmark where
the mother instituted proceedings for custody following a separation.
At the same time, the father forcibly removed the child from Denmark and set up residence in Toronto (having entered under a
false passport) but he was refused landed immigrant status.
The courts of the English countries operating under the common
law system will look with great disfavour on any attempt to flout the
invoked jurisdiction of a proper court in a foreign country unless the
paramount interests of the child demand that such be done - and
such paramount interest of the child is to be demonstrated by cogent proof that to leave the child with the parent which had custody
in the country of original jurisdiction will seriously endanger the
child's welfare. Having regard to the age and sex of the child and
the precarious nature of the father's status in Canada, the above
onus was not satisfied. In addition, there were serious charges and
counter-charges of misconduct between the parties which would
affect the question of custody and which ought to be heard before
a Danish court since they can only properly be decided by viva
voce evidence.
Custody - Jurisdiction- Removal of Children from ForeignJurisdiction during ProceedingsInvolving Custody - Manitoba Court
of Queen's Bench
Prossor-Jonesv. Prossor-Jones (1972), 7 R.F.L. 150.
In a general sense, children are wards of the superior courts with
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jurisdiction in the district in which they reside. In a special sense,
when proceedings are started in a court which involve their status,
either in regard to questions of custody, or in regard to questions of
adoption, or other like matters, they become especially wards of the
court. To physically remove them from the jurisdiction of that court
is an act which cannot be condoned or tolerated. Therefore, the
parent who removed them must not obtain benefit from such an
improper action and the Manitoba court will order them to be returned.
Infants -

Maintenance-

Jurisdiction-

Ontario High Court

Emerson v. Emerson, [1972] 3 O.R. 5.
The Ontario court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain an
application for maintenance under the Infants Act, R.S.O., 1970, c.
222, notwithstanding that maintenance to be paid in respect of the
particular child of divorced parents had already been set by the
Supreme Court of New Brunswick in the decree absolute. A divorce
decree in the superior court of one province under the Divorce Act,
R.S.C., 1970, c. D-8, which gives corollary relief in respect of children of the marriage under section io of that Act, does not inhibit
the exercise of any ordinary jurisdiction in another province for the
custody, maintenance, care, or upbringing of such children there.
The future rights of children of divorced parents do not necessarily
depend on the state of marriage or the condition of divorce between
their parents. In their capacity as citizens and children, they are entitled to the protection of the provincial superior courts exercising
the prerogative of the Crown in the right of the province as parens
patriae.
It may well be, however, that no court other than the court which
originally made an order under the Divorce Act would have jurisdiction either to make a fresh order or to vary the decrees or orders
already made. It may well be true also that a party to a divorce
petition enjoying rights or benefits under such a decree or order,
cannot continue to enjoy those rights or benefits in any province if
he or she elects to seek to vary them by invoking normal provincial
jurisdiction without regard to the exercise of the divorce jurisdiction
in his or her favour.
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Affiliation Proceedings-

Jurisdiction-

Ontario ProvincialCourt

Woods v.Goldamer (i97), 7 R.F.L. 181.
An Ontario court has jurisdiction to hear an affiliation application brought by a non-resident mother against a putative father
resident in Ontario in respect of a child conceived and born outside
the province. The residency of the father is the essential test for
jurisdiction.
Foreign Maintenance Order tario Court of Appeal

Registration-

Other Relief -

On-

Re Katz and Kaye (1 9 7 2), 27 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 33, [1972] 20.R. 8 5 4.
An appeal from an order dismissing an application to set aside
the registration of a Michigan judgment under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, R.S.O., 1970, c. 403 was
dismissed.
The onus of showing that the appellant was not domiciled in the
State of Michigan at the time of the divorce action and that he did
not attorn to the Michigan jurisdiction lies upon the appellant and
was not fulfilled here.
In addition the court held that registration of a judgment under
the Act is merely one procedure for enforcing a judgment for maintenance and does not preclude the person registering from other
relief.

Reciprocal Maintenance Ordersbia County Court

Enforcement -

British Colum-

Attorney General v. Buschkewitz, [1970] 3 W.W.R. 17.
A German court has no jurisdiction to issue a "final" order
against a person who was served with process in British Columbia.
Thus enforcement of the order will be refused in British Columbia.
Foreign Maintenance Order tories Magistrate's Court

Enforcement -

Northwest Terri-

Bianowsky v. Bianowsky, [1972] 6 W.W.R. 679.
A probation officer has no authority to enforce an Alberta maintenance order registered in the Northwest Territories. He is not "an
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officer of the Court" as those words are used in The Maintenance
Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T., 1956,
c. 63.
Foreign Judgment Court of Appeal

Registration-

Time Limitation -

Alberta

McCormack v. Starr, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 239.
A defendant against whom a judgment has been registered pursuant to an ex parte order under the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Judgments Act, R.S.A., 1970, c. 312 may apply to set it aside within
one month after he has had notice of the registration. However, the
notice of motion must be both filed and served within that time.
Foreign Judgment for Arrears of Maintenance Policy- British Columbia Supreme Court

Finality-

Public

Patton v. Reed, [1972] 6 W.W.R. 2o8.
The court was willing to enforce an Idaho judgment for an
amount representing twenty years arrears in maintenance payments
consolidated into a lump sum even though in British Columbia a
judgment for arrears of maintenance in excess of one year could not
be awarded or enforced. Since the Idaho judgment was for a lump
sum and not for periodical payments, it was considered final and
conclusive. Thus its enforcement did not offend the public policy of
British Columbia.

